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LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
Fowler V. Harper*
I
VARIATIONS IN STATEMENT OF LIABILITY
A S a logical matter there seem to be two possible schemes of legal
liability. The first one may be stated as follows: One may be
liable for all consequences of all of his acts. While it has been sug-
gested that this was the principle of the mediaeval law, it has been
pointed out by Professor Winfield that such was never literally the
case. Under this principle, as he has shown, everyone would be in
jail except for these reasons: no one could legally put anyone else in
jail, no one could legally keep anyone else in jail, and no one could
legally build a jail in the first place.'
The second scheme of liability - the one actually in force - may
be stated in three ways: (I) one may be liable for some of the conse-
quences of all of his acts, or (2) one may be liable for all the conse-
quences of some of his acts, or (3) one may be liable for some of the
consequences of some of his acts. Now these three statements are in
fact three different statements of the same thing. To state that one
is liable for some consequences of all acts, for all consequences of some
acts, or for some consequences of some acts is merely repeating the
same proposition in three different ways. As a practical matter, the
common law principle is generally stated in the third way, and the
problem in every case is to know what consequences of what acts entail
liability. The line which separates conduct (act) from consequences is
an arbitrary line and can be put wherever one finds it most con-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University Law School. Editor, Indiana Law Journal.
M.A., Iowa; S.J.D., Michigan. Author of articles in various legal periodicals.-Ed.
'Winfield, "The Myth of Absolute Liability," 4z L. Q. REv. 37 (1926).
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venient to put it. For certain purposes the common law put it at
the point which divided actions in trespass from actions on the case.
In trespass, the injury had to be "part of the act", in case the injury
was a "consequence" only. Just as we do find it convenient to divide
the flux of experience into causes and effects in order to make them
easier to treat, we have found it desirable in the law to treat human
experiences as composed of the two elements- human conduct and
its consequences. As Mr. Justice Holmes says, a person is really liable
even in trespass for the consequences of his conduct But it is no
less true that he is liable for his conduct. Now since the line drawn
between the two is arbitrary and conventional, there is some choice
as to precisely where this line shall be drawn in stating principles of
liability. The choice should be determined solely by considerations of
intelligibility and logical coherence of statement. Under such circum-
stances we should expect to find some difference of opinion for the
reason, if for no other, that several methods of statement may be
equally intelligible and equally true. What Poincar6 finds true of
physical phenomena is certainly true of legal- that where there is
one explanation for a thing there are an infinite number of explana-
tions! At least, we find there is more than one.
Perhaps the best instance of this is the three methods of stating
the legal principles which control liability for negligence. These three
methods indicate how liability may be expressed in terms of the
character of the conduct and the character of the consequences with
varying degrees of emphasis upon the one or upon the other. These
three methods may be identified with three familiar names, not because
the methods represent exactly the techniques of these three persons
but because in a general way they do represent their tendencies to
analyze liability and state results by placing different degrees of em-
phasis respectively upon conduct and consequences. The three methods
may also be identified for the purpose of making the comparison dearer
with three well known cases in the law of torts. The first method is
the one which we may, for convenience, associate with the name of
Judge Andrews," and which is fairly well illustrated by the well known
case of Hoag v. Lake Shore R. R.' According to the analysis here
employed, the conduct upon which liability is based need only be
2 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 91 (is8i).
FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE 120 (1913).
'Dissefiting in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 16z N. E. 99
(1928).
' 85"Pa. St. 293, 27 Am. Rep. 653 (1877).
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such as involves unreasonable risk of some foreseeable harms to some
persons. Neither the harms threatened nor the persons threatened
are referred to particularly or even generally. Defendant's con-
duct is sufficiently culpable to become the basis of liability if it can
be characterized as "negligence in the air." Given this type of conduct,
the problem becomes one of determining what consequences defendant
is liable for. According to this technique the defendant is liable for
consequences (I) which are of the general class of harms which make
his conduct negligent, (2) if the person injured is of the general class
of persons who are threatened by the defendant's abstract negligence,
and (3) if the harm is brought about in a way as is not unjust
to hold defendant liable therefor. A somewhat elaborate set of rules
has been worked out to determine whether or not the injury in a
particular case is such a consequence as to satisfy the last of these
three requirements. Beyond somewhat vague applications of the fore-
seeability test nothing has been formulated to assist with the first two
requirements.
The second method of analysis is one which may be associated with
the name of Professor Bohlen' and which is illustrated by the case of
In re Polemis and Farness, etc., Co.7 According to this method of
stating the law, conduct which is the basis of liability must be such
that it creates unreasonable risks of a general type to persons of a
general class. Given this type of conduct on the part of defendant,
he is liable for all consequences which occur in such a way that it is
not unjust to hold him liable therefor. It will be noted that according
to this method two of the considerations which, according to Judge
Andrews' manner of statement, determine the character of the conse-
quences for which one is liable are now employed to determine the
character of the conduct for which one is liable. In other words,
whereas Judge Andrews stated that one who created any kind of unrea-
sonable risk of injury to anybody was liable for all consequences which
were injuries of a general class to a general class of persons if they
occur in a certain manner, Professor Bohlen states that a person to be
negligent must create risks of a certain general class of harms to a
general class of persons and if he is thus negligent, he is liable for all
consequences which occur according to a certain sequence. Professor
' "The Probable or the Natural Consequences as the Test of Liability in Negli-
gence," 40 AM. L. REG. (N. S.) 79, 148 (1901), STUDIES IN THE LAW OF ToRS I
(1926). The technique ascribed to Professor Bohlen has also been employed by Mr.
Beven in his admirable work on NEGLIGENCE.
7 [x921] 3 K. B. 56o.
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Bohlen has thus emphasized somewhat more the character of the
conduct at the expense of the character of the consequences. He has,
however, recognized the same general factors as significant as were
so recognized by Judge Andrews; the difference in the two systems
being largely one of the form of statement.
The third method of statement is that employed by Dean Green8
and illustrated by the case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co.' The
technique here is to state the principles of liability for negligence by
placing practically all the emphasis upon the character of defendant's
conduct. To be liable, a defendant must creat a risk (i) of a general
type, (2) to a general class of persons, (3) which is possible of consum-
mation in a way such that it will not be unjust to hold defendant liable
therefor. One who is negligent according to this formula is liable
for all consequences actually ensuing from his conduct. It is to be
noticed that Dean Green has here taken all three of the major consider-
ations of policy which Judge Andrews employed to determine the
character of the consequences for which a defendant would be liable,
and has used them to determine the character of the conduct for which
the defendant is liable. Again the difference is merely one of state-
ment of the law as found in the cases. All the cases which Judge
Andrews can present intelligibly according to his formula, Dean Green
and Professor Bohlen can state quite intelligibly according to theirs.
It may be that some one of these three methods makes it a little easier
to state the law or makes it a little more intelligible when stated. From
a rational point of view, each method of statement is at least a possible
one and whatever choice there may be between them must be based
upon the ease with which one or the other characterizes the decided
cases. One person will like one manner of statement better than
another; but it is important to realize that substantially the same policy
factors are being recognized and that the difference is one of for-
mulation.
In the area of tort law where we talk of liability without fault,
it appears that the results of the decisions can also be readily stated
according to the three schemes just outlined for stating the law of
negligence - namely, in terms of (a) the general type of risk created,
8 THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
9 z48 N. Y. 339 (I9z8). The Palsgraf case is not a pat case to illustrate
Dean Green's technique. It may very well be that Chief Judge Cardozo was thinking
in terms of the second method of analysis - that one attributed to Professor Bohlen.
The writer has found no case in which the court has unequivocally employed the
Green analysis. The Palsgraf case comes as close to this technique as any case
available.
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(b) the general class of persons threatened and (c) the manner in
which the harm occurs, that is, the sequence of events involved.
II
FACTORS IN "ABSOLUTE" LIAILITY
Dean Thayer' pointed out the error in the popular assumption
that the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher makes the defendant liable for all
consequences in fact resulting from his conduct. This is precisely what
the rule of the case does not do; it makes defendant liable, as will
appear shortly, only for proximate consequences, not for remote conse-
quences. Dean Thayer seems to have thought, however, that this
was due to subsequent limitations of the rule imposed by later cases
and that the rule, as originally enunciated, included liability for remote
as well as proximate damage. We cannot agree that this was the
real state of the matter. In enunciating the celebrated judgment in
the Court of Exchequer Chamber," Blackburn, J., suggested, it may
be remembered, some of the limitations of liability. A man who
collected dangerous substances on his land was liable, he said, for the
damage which was the "natural" consequence of their escape. The
meaning to be ascribed to the adjective "natural" is to be ascertained
in the light of the statement which the judge made immediately there-
after. He pointed out that he thought a defendant could absolve
himself from liability by showing that the escape was due to an act
of God or vis major. This looks remarkably like some of the limita-
tions imposed by the rules governing proximate causation. Moreover,
although Dean Thayer conceived of liability under Rylands v. Fletcher
as extending properly to proximate consequences only, he thought that
there was no such limitation to liability under other heads of liability
without fault, as, to use his examples, workmen's compensation
statutes and liability for keeping dangerous animals. On the contrary,
it will appear in what follows that the same limitation (stated her(
in terms of causal connection) applies equally under all principles o:
strict liability.
As a starting point we may formulate an hypothesis which cover
most of the casts of liability without fault. This may be done in suc
broad terms that no one will take exception thereto: some types
10 In an article written shortly before his death, "Liability Without Fault,"
HAMv. L. REv. Sox (1916), SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF ToRTS 599 (194).
11L. R. i Ex. z65 (1866).
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conduct create such risks of harms to others, even when the conduct
itself is careful, that, though the creation of the risks is not itself
unreasonable because of the social utility of the conduct, nevertheless
it is unreasonable for the person injured to bear his own loss. We may
state the rules of strict liability, then, in answer to the parts of the
following general questions: (I) what types of conduct lawful in
themselves are so hazardous (2) to certain classes of persons (3) that
the actor must assume some risks of the consequences to those persons?
I. The General Class of Harms Threatened
The answer to the first part of our question may be given in terms
of the various type-fact situations which we call nuisance -keeping
wild or vicious animals, keeping domestic animals, collecting large
quantities of dangerous substances on one's land, maintaining fires, etc.,
which have gradually become the conduct-basis of liability without
fault. If the actor has engaged in such conduct, it is submitted that
he is liable for all consequences which satisfy the other requirements
of our proposed formula. But one who engages in extra-hazardous
conduct is liable only for those consequences which belong to the
general class of harms threatened by his conduct. Thus, though the
defendant keeps, a wild animal that is vicious by nature, he is not
liable for injuries produced by a horse becoming frightened and run-
ning away at the sight of the animal on the road.1" Such a harm is
not one of the general classes of harms which make his conduct extra-
hazardous. It is not a result of the animal's vicious disposition. A
similar result is reached where the defendant accumulates quantities of
electricity on his land in dangerous amounts. He is not liable for
consequences which were outside the general class of harms which
make his conduct dangerous, such as injury to the plaintiff's electrical
equipment.1 The policy of the law does not impose the rule of
3trict liability to protect against harms incident to the plaintiff's extra-
)rdinary and unusual uses of land. The same is true where the defen-
lant's conduct is charged to be a nuisance because of excessive heat
)roduced by the defendant's manufacturing process, wheie the plain-
iff's injury consists of damage to a very delicate type of paper which
e is keeping for sale on his premises.' The injury is not one of the
.neral class, the risk of which makes defendant's conduct a nuisance.
'
2 Scribner v. Kelly, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) i4 (i86z).
18 Eastern & S. African Tel. Co. v. Cape Town Tramways [19oz] A. C. g8z.
'*Robinson v. Kilvert, 41 Ch. D. 88 (1889).
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The same principles govern the liability for injuries by domestic
animals known to have vicious tendencies. The general risk which is
the basis of liability is what may be reasonably expected from such
viciousness, and no other harms. Thus, keeping an animal known to
attack other animals but never known to attack human beings is insuf-
ficient to hold the owner for the latter type of harm. 5 The keeper of
such an animal is liable only for the general type of harm which makes
his conduct extra-hazardous, that is, that type of injury which he knew
or had noticed that the animal had a propensity to commit."6
A similar limitation is to be found in the law relating to trespassing
animals. The owner is held liable because of a very definite general
class of risks in the keeping of cattle, viz., their escape, wanderings and
trespasses and damage incident thereto. Thus, even though a defen-
dant is liable for the trespass of his domestic animals, he is not liable at
all for injuries to the person alone, as such is not the type of harm
which makes the keeping of the animal extra-hazardous. "For this
reason," says Judge Cooley," "the keeper of a domestic animal is not
in general responsible for any mischief that may be done by such animal
which was of a kind not to be expected from him." In Hadwell v.
Righton 8 a fowl belonging to the defendant escaped on to the road,
became frightened at a dog and flew into the wheels of a passing cyclist.
The owner was held not liable for personal injuries to the rider, al-
though the court thought there might be liability if it were shown that
fowls were liable to fly at bicycle wheels. Similarly, in Cox v. Bur-
bidge9 the owner was not liable for the kicking of a person by his horse
when it did not appear that the defendant knew his horse to be vicious.
Furthermore, the principle under discussion limits the measure of
damages. A plaintiff can recover, in addition to the damages for the
trespass, other damage sustained, btqt he must show the damage
to be a harm of the general class to be apprehended from the trespass.
Thus, where the defendant's sheep trespassed in plaintiff's field and
infected his sheep, the defendant was liable for the "consequential"
damages.21 "It appears to me," said the court, "to be the natural
consequence of the trespass by the defendant's sheep that the plaintiff's
BEightlinger v. Egan, 65 Ili. 235 (1872); Osborne v. Chocqueel [1896] z
Q. B. 1O9.
"o See Klinberg v. Russell, 125 Ind. 531, z5 N. E. 596 (I89O).
17 2 COOLEY ON ToRns, 3d ed., 69z (19o6).
18 [1907] 2 K. B. 345-
19 13 C. B. (N. S.) 430 (1863).
2 0 Theyer v. Purnell [ 1918 ] 2 K. B. 3 3 3.
No- 7 100 7
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own sheep might contract scab from defendant's sheep." The same
result was reached when the defendant's trespassing stallion bit the
plaintiff's mare"' and where the defendant's worthless bull got the
plaintiff's thoroughbred cow with calf.22 It is noteworthy that some
of the commentators have actually explained these cases in the language
of proximate causation as understood by Judge Andrews. Thus, Pol-
lock observes:23
"It is the nature of cattle and other live stock to stray if not
kept in, and to do damage if they stray; and the owner is bound to
keep them from straying on the land of others at his peril, though
. . . the liability is only for natural and probable consequences,
not for an unexpected event."
And Beven, in rationalizing a case in which the owner of a horse was
held liable for personal injuries committed while it was trespassing,
declares:24
"When a horse is where it should not be, and kicks, the kicking
is not so far remote from what is to be expected from the natural
disposition of horses that the injury cannot be said to follow in
the natural and obvious sequence from the original wrongful act
which allowed the horse to get where an opportunity of doing
injury is given."
As a final illustration of the way in which strict liability is limited
to the general class of harms that render the conduct extra-hazardous,
we may refer to the cases denying liability for damage caused by
blasting when the damage is produced by concussions of the atmos-
phere. 5 Those courts which deny liability are simply holding that
such harms are not of the general class which makes defendant's
conduct extra-hazardous. Courts which take a different view are
extending the general class of consequences for which there is strict
liability.
2. The General Class of Persons Threatened
The second factor in determining the scope of liability for extra-
hazardous conduct - the determination of the general class of persons
protected from the harms threatened by extra-hazardous conduct-
21 Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R. Io C. P. Io (1874).
22 Crawford v. Williams, 48 Iowa 247 (1878).
23 ToRTS, i~th ed., 514.
24 1 NEGLIGENCE, 4th ed., 86 (1928).
25 See cases collected in Smith, "Liability for Blasting," 33 HARV. L. REV.
542, 667 (1920), SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 614 (1924).
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offers little difficulty. The persons exposed to the risk are usually a
rather definite class of persons, such as adjoining landowners, in the
Rylands v. Fletcher situation, or persons in the neighborhood, in the
case of nuisance. Two or three situations will serve to illustrate the
workings of the principle. The case of keeping watchdogs is in point.
It has been decided that trespassers, 6 and a fortiori licensees and
invitees," are within the protection of the rules of strict liability for
keeping dangerous dogs; but persons guilty of a criminal trespass or a
felony are not within the protection of the rule. 8 They do not belong
to the general class of persons as to whom the risk of injury from the
keeping of vicious dogs should be made a basis of liability.
Again, in the law of liability for physical invasions of property
due to blasting, it has been decided by one court that there is no liability
to persons whose premises are at a distance such that there is no
reason to expect that they will be damaged by the blasting activities. "
3. The Manner in Which the Harm Occurs
In the last place, even if the harm sustained by the plaintiff belongs
to the general class of harms the risk of which makes the defendant's
conduct extra-hazardous to the plaintiff or persons in a similar position,
it must have occurred in a particular manner. The sequence of events
must have been such that it is not unfair to hold the defendant liable
therefor. Here we find the ordinary rules governing legal causation
quite adequate to state the law. Thus, although accumulation of water
is extra-hazardous because its escape involves a risk of serious damage
to adjoining property holders, nevertheless the escape must occur in
the ordinary course of nature, and if some superseding cause occasions
the escape there is no liability. We have such a superseding cause
where the escape is caused by the act of God or by a vis major which
defendant is not bound as a reasonable man to anticipate." Even the
gnawing of a rat may be such an unexpected, independent cause as to
make it unjust to hold defendant liable.2 So, also, if the escape of
the water is brought about by the intervening wrongful act of a third
6 Sherfey v. Bartley, 4 Sneed 58, 67 Am. Dec. 597 (i856).
27 Sylvester v. Maag, i55 Pa. St. 2=5 (1893); Conway v. Grant, 88 Ga. 4o,
13 S. E. 803 (1891).
28 See Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. z21 (1862) and Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend.
(N. Y.) 496, 31 Am. Dec. 3o6 (1837).
29 Klepsch v. Donald, 4 Wash. 436, 30 Pac. 991 (i8 9 2).
"°Nichols v. Marsland, L. R. 1o Ex. 255 (1875); L. R. 2 Ex. D. I (1876).31 Carstairs v. Taylor, L. R. 6 Ex. 217 (1871).
No- 7 1oo 9
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person which was not foreseeable under the circumstances, the defen-
dant is relieved from liability."'
Liabilities under the Workmen's Compensation Statutes can be
analyzed in much the same manner. The statutes provide that employ-
ers shall be made liable for injuries resulting from accidents "arising
out of and in the course of the employment." The courts hold not
only that the injury complained of must be a general class of harms
which the statute was designed to govern and must relate to employees
- the class of persons for whose exclusive benefit the law was passed
- but they also require that the injury must be brought about in
a manner so that it is not unjust to hold the defendant responsible
therefor. There is, of course, no difficulty as to the class of persons
to be protected. The statutes were passed for the exclusive benefit of
employees and apply to them alone. Examples of the limitation thus
imposed upon the application of the rule of strict liability are to be
found in cases denying compensation when the workman is struck by
lightning or injured by the interposition of some act of God, 3 and
in cases where the injury is brought about by the independent acts of
other employees or third persons and which are in no way connected
with the duties of the employment. The "horse play" cases, of which
there are a large number, are in point.3 " But if the "horse play" be
carried on by an employee known by the employer to be addicted to
such practice so that it becomes a "condition of the employment," then
the injury is by accident "arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment." " Another example is the line of cases considering compensa-
tion for injuries occasioned by an assault of a fellow workman. If
the altercation arises out of some disagreement pertaining to the work,
the assault of the fellow workman does not prevent compensation,"
but if it arises from some independent disagreement, the injury is not
compensable.3  This fits the proximate cause formula beautifully. It
is not unexpectable that men will quarrel over their work. But it is
hardly foreseeable that independent and collateral matters will precipi-
tate an assault by one employee upon another. In many of these
cases, the courts employ the exact language of the proximate cause
32 Box v. Jubb, 4 Ex. D. 76 (1879); Rickards v. Lothian [i913] A. C. z63.
33 Deckard v. Trustees of Indiana University (Ind. 1930) 172 N. E. 547,
noted in 6 IND. L. J. 194 (1931). See 26 MIcH. L. REv. 307 (1928).
"Lee's Case, 240 Mass. 473, 134 N. E. 268 (1922).
5 In re Loper, 65 Ind. App. 571, ii8 N. E. 324 (1917).
"Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Comm., 285 III. 31, i20 N. E. 530 (I918).
37 Armitage v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 86 L. T. 883 (19o2).
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cases, with the exception of the label.88 In short, the courts have
interpreted the phrase "accident arising out of and in the course of
the employment" to be equivalent to an "accident proximately caused
by the employment."
In the cases allowing a recovery for injuries caused by keeping
vicious animals, it appears that the injuries always occur in a manner
or sequence of events that brings them within the orthodox rules of
proximate causation. Where a recovery is sought for injuries due
to an attack by a vicious dog, the owner is liable even if there is an
intervening cause if it was to be expected, as, for example, where
defendant's dog bit the plaintiff not by reason of its vicious character
but because it was rabid,8" or because of its playfulness."0 In each
of these cases defendant indulges in the type of conduct which is the
basis of liability, in knowingly keeping a dangerous brute; plaintiff
sustains an injury of a general type which makes the keeping of the
animal extra-hazardous; and, while the particular injury arises in an
unusual manner, nevertheless it is known that a vicious dog may injure
persons even in play, and vicious dogs as well as gentle dogs will
sometimes go mad. Again, where defendant keeps a dangerous animal
and the same is teased and infuriated by third persons,4' or where it
is released by a third party,42 the act of the third party is not so extra-
ordinary and unexpectable that the defendant's conduct is not the
proximate cause of the injury. The case is even easier here, for the
possible careless action of others is one of the risks which makes the
keeping of dogs extra-hazardous. It is quite analogous to the negli-
gence case in which the defendant's motorman leaves his street car
unguarded on a steep decline and a negligent passenger releases the
brake. It is quite properly held that defendant's negligence is the
proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff since the act of the passen-
ger is one of the very risks which makes the defendant's conduct
unreasonable. 3
The same limitations are to be found where defendant has kept
domestic animals. The rule of strict liability makes him liable for
38 See DeFilippis v. Falkenberg, 155 N. Y. S. 761 (1915) and Pekin Cooperage
Co. v. Industrial Comm., 285 Ill. 31, 12o N. E. 530 (1918).
" Clinkenbeard v. Reinert (Mo. 1920) 2±5 S. W. 667, noted in 34 HARv. L.
REv. 770 (192i).
40 Oakes v. Spalding, 40 Vt. 347 (1867).
41 Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627 (188i).
42 Baker v. Snell [19o8] z K. B. 352, 825.
48Kleibenstein v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co., 193 Iowa 892, 188 N. W. 12 9
(1977).
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trespasses but it is to be noted that the trespass must be a proximate
consequence of the escape of the domestic animal or the owner of the
animal will not be liable therefor. Thus, where an intermeddling
stranger drives the defendant's cattle on plaintiff's land, the defendant
is not liable, the damage having been caused by the unforeseeable
independent act of a stranger. 44 But where the stranger by a wrongful
act releases the defendant's cattle which afterward wander onto the
plaintiff's land, the defendant is liable, for the trespass here is suffi-
ciently connected with the reason for the rule of strict liability as to
properly come within its scope." That is, the trespass is the proximate
consequence of the escape and properly attributable to the wandering
propensities of domestic animals.
In the case of liability for damage done by the escape of fire, it
was recognized in the early law that the manner in which the risk was
consummated might affect liability. As early as 1697, in Tabervil v.
Stamp,46 it was admitted that "if a sudden storm had arisen which he
(defendant) could not stop, it was matter of evidence and he should
have showed it." Here, certainly, is a suggestion that some conse-
quences of maintaining fires are brought about by an extraordinary
sequence of events so that it would be unfair to hold defendant liable
therefor. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that the modern
decisions, in those relatively few situations in which there is strict
liability for escape of fire, do rely upon the orthodox proximate cause
apparatus to limit the scope of liability. In a recent case, 7 plaintiff
sued a railroad company under a statute imposing liability regardless
of fault or negligence for fires caused by the operation of the railroad.
Plaintiff's employee had removed the cover of the dome of plaintiff's
car of gasoline standing on a siding. The employee, though using
due diligence, was unable to replace the lid before the defendant's
locomotive passed at a distance of about 5oo feet. The fire from the
engine's fire box ignited the fumes and vapor of the gasoline and
destroyed two cars of gasoline and a car of oil. It was held that
defendant was not liable. "It dearly appears," reasoned the court,
"that the proximate cause of the fire in question was the act of the
agent of the Oil Company in removing the cap from the dome of the
tank car. . . . The fire was not caused by the operation of the railroad
within the meaning" of the statute.
"Hartford v. Brady, II4 Mass. 466, 19 Am. Rep. 377 (1874).
"Noys v. Colby, 3o N. H. 143 (1855).
46I Salk. 13 (169i).
47 Davis v. Atlas AssuranceCo., iiz Ohio St. 543, 147 N. E. 913 (1925).
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III
DOCTRINAL STATEMENT OF THE LAW OF STRICT LIABILITY
Current statements of the law of strict liability are extraordinarily
unsatisfactory. The paucity of scientific exposition of the law in this
field has made it so difficult to comprehend the appropriate scope of
the principles of liability involved that courts are frequently at a loss
adequately to rationalize their judgments." This inadequacy of expo-
sition is so marked that as ingenious a scholar as Salmond is forced to
state the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher in a somewhat generalized way
and then set forth a long list of "exceptions" to the generalizations.49
This, it must be admitted, is unsatisfactory and makes it difficult to
grasp the true scope of the principle of liability. If we abandon this
manner of stating the law, and make an effort to synthesize the cases
and assimilate them to well understood dogmas, we are faced with
a choice of methods of statement analogous to the choice of three
methods described above for the statement of the law of negligence.
Now it is submitted that a method analogous to the techniques
employed by Dean Green and Professor Bohlen in their statements of
the law of negligence is not at all suitable for the statement of the law
of strict liability. The reason of this unsuitability seems to lie in the
fact that they have exploited the duty concept in a manner which will
not work here. Negligence is regarded as a breach of a duty to use
appropriate care. Accordingly the problems at once arise to whom
is the duty owed and what is its extent. Thus Professor Bohlen speaks
of a duty to use due care, owed to this person or that person but not
to some other person 50 and Dean Green speaks of a duty which
comprehends this risk or that risk consummated in such and such a
manner, but which does not comprehend some other risk." Both forms
of statement involve the notion of a duty which is owed to particular
persons and which is definitely limited in scope. But the duty concept
is of value only where defendant is morally culpable, because duty is
primarily a moral concept. It is so shot through with moral connota-
tions that it actually misdescribes the character of the defendant's
48 A striking instance of this is the recent California case of Green v. General
Petroleum Corporation (Cal. 193i) 270 Pac. 952.
4 SALMOND, TORTS, 7 th ed., ch. ix (1923). Cf. POLLOCK, TORTS, 13th ed., 510
f. (1929).
50 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS, sec. 165 (929).51 See many instances in RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE and Dean Green's
various essays.
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conduct in cases where there is no moral fault. There is a temptation
to employ the notion of duty in all cases of legal liability; this tempta-
tion proceeds from the fact that the duty hypothesis presupposes a
rule of conduct which existed prior to the acts complained of. It is
consistent with our sense of fairness to enunciate rules of liability in
terms of pre-existing duties which the parties may be supposed to
have known and which they presumably might have complied with.
This accounts for the fact that attempts are so commonly made to state
every type of liability without fault in terms of duty, which, of course,
implies fault. Thus, Bishop insisted that the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher was based on fault,52 Cooley thought that liability for keeping
vicious animals was based on negligence," Smith found fault to be the
basis of liability for blasting,"' and the American Law Institute now
restates the law of trespass quaere clausum fregit largely in terms of
fault.5" Thayer thought that the law of negligence could now dispose
of most cases without the use of "more eccentric doctrines." 56 But
it is noteworthy that attempts to state many of the rules of strict liabil-
ity in terms of duty do not meet with marked success. Observe, for
example, the difficulties of the court in the case of Baker v. Snell; 7
the judicial opinions varied from the statement that it was a breach
of duty to keep a vicious animal at all, to the statement that the breach
of duty occurred when the animal inflicted the injury. In modern
text books it is sometimes said that the duty owed by defendant is to
prevent the injury at all costs. 8 But by hypothesis in cases of strict
liability, the defendant could not prevent the injury by taking reason-
able precautions. Hence, he owes a duty not to indulge in the conduct
at all or to perform the impossible. It is not very intelligible to state
the law in terms of duties which it is impossible to perform.
Thus, the duty concept is inappropriate to characterize the strict
liability cases. With the duty notion must go the possibility of a
practical application of either Dean Green's or Professor Bohlen's
technique for stating the law. If defendant has indulged in extra-
52 BisHOP, NON-CONTRACT LAW 385, note 3.
53 z COOLEY ON ToRTS, 3 d ed., ch. xi (i9o6).
54 "Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting," 33 HARV.
L. REv. 542, 667 (1920), SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 614 (i924).
n See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS, tentative draft, No. 7, c. I (93I).
55 Thayer, "Liability without Fault," 29 HARV. L. REv. 8oi (1916), SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 599 (1924).
17 [1908] z K. B. 8z5.
" SALMOND, TORTS, 7th ed., 344 (19z3); POLLOCK, TORTS, 13th ed., 5oo if.
(1929).
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hazardous conduct at all, he has engaged in conduct which may be
the basis for legal liability. It is awkward to say that he has indulged
in conduct which is the basis for liability to some persons for some
general classes of injuries but not to other persons for other types of
harms. It is much more intelligible to state that the defendant has
engaged in a type of conduct which is a sufficient basis of liability, and
then determine what consequences of such conduct he is liable for.
By this method the three considerations of policy which Judge Andrews
employed to determine the character of the consequences of defendant's
negligence may here be employed in the same manner. If one does
not like the term "proximate consequence" one need not use it. It
would seem, however, that all the dogmas which until the last twenty-
five years determined whether consequences of "negligence in the
air" were proximate are appropriate for determining whether conse-
quences of extra-hazardous conduct entail liability.
